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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
DEAN DILLER: Good evening. My name is Matthew Diller, and I 
have the honor of being the Dean of Fordham University School of Law. 
I would like to welcome all of you to the seventeenth Annual Sommer 
Lecture, which we are very proud to host here at the law school. In a few 
minutes, you will be hearing the lecture delivered by Ira Hammerman, 
and we are very excited to have you here with us tonight and very 
interested in hearing your remarks and your thoughts. 
The Sommer Lecture is a great partnership between the firm of 
Morgan Lewis—and I am pleased to see so many Morgan Lewis 
representatives here with us tonight—and Fordham Law School, and in 
particular, with our Corporate Law Center here at Fordham. 
That marriage is not an incidental or accidental result; rather, it stems 
from the work of the great John Peloso. I want to acknowledge and thank 
you, John. John is a graduate of our school from the Class of 1960. He is 
a founder of the Corporate Law Center here at Fordham. The Corporate 
Law Center is a key part of our business law programs. We are one of the 
great business law schools in this country, and that is in good measure 
due to the work that we do through the Corporate Center, which is our 
major hub of activity around corporate law. 
John had the foresight and vision to help us found the Center and 
help build it and grow it to where it is now. He has also taught here as a 
member of our adjunct faculty, and it is always a pleasure to see you and 
to collaborate with you, John. 
I am also grateful to Ben Indek, a Partner at Morgan Lewis. Thank 
you for your support and your collaboration, both tonight and into the 
future in this greater collaboration between our school and your great law 
firm. 
I want to say a couple of more things about the Corporate Law 
Center, and then we can get on with this evening’s main event. I do want 
to point out that the Center was established in 2001. There are three areas 
that it focuses on: the first is public lectures; to wit, roundtable 
discussions, expert panels, conferences, and programs that help educate 
those in the legal community, business community, and the public at large 
on important issues around corporate governance and corporate law. The 
Center is also a platform that showcases and supports the work of our 
fabulous faculty—a number of whom are with us tonight—in the field of 
corporate law. Corporate law has played a key role in bringing our faculty 
together and projecting our research and work out into the world. Third, 
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and extremely importantly, the Center is a resource for students here at 
Fordham Law School. It connects them to our alumni through the 
business law practitioner series and through a variety of other mentoring 
programs that bring our students on board and help carry forth our 
school’s tradition in corporate law. 
Finally, I will mention one more aspect of the Corporate Law Center, 
which is a relatively new initiative: our corporate compliance initiative. 
We have seen the tremendous growth in compliance as a field. Given our 
strength in corporate law and financial regulation, we have established the 
first LL.M. degree in corporate compliance, and we have followed that by 
establishing what is called an M.S.L. degree, a Master of Studies in Law, 
a one-year Master’s degree for non-lawyers who want to specialize, focus, 
and build careers in compliance. That program started in January. We 
have a number of exciting upcoming events. I will not list them all; 
instead I will direct you to the Corporate Law Center website. 
I also want to thank Vera Korzun for putting together and 
coordinating tonight’s program and for all the work that you do as 
Director of the Center. At this point, I want to introduce Ben Indek of 
Morgan Lewis, who will then introduce Mr. Hammerman. Thank you all. 
MR. INDEK: Good evening, everybody. On behalf of Morgan 
Lewis, I wanted to offer my own welcome to the seventeenth Annual A. 
A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture. 
In 1979, Al Sommer started Morgan Lewis’ securities regulatory 
practice. We created this lecture series in his name as a way to honor his 
contribution to our firm and his enduring legacy at Morgan Lewis. 
The last several years have been very exciting for our firm. We 
elected a new chair, Jami McKeon, an incredible leader for Morgan Lewis 
and a true visionary in the changing landscape of the law firm world. She 
is also fully and enthusiastically committed to our securities regulatory 
practice. We welcomed hundreds of lawyers through our combination 
with Bingham, including many exceptional attorneys in the securities 
enforcement, regulatory, and class action practices. We expanded 
internationally as well, merging with one of the most prominent firms in 
Singapore and adding a vibrant new office in Shanghai. Tonight we pause 
to thank Al and his colleague Lloyd Feller, who is here tonight, for 
creating this practice area at Morgan Lewis more than three decades ago. 
We stand on their broad shoulders. 
A little history: Al was a Morgan Lewis partner from 1979 until 1994 
when he became counsel to the firm. He was a tireless public servant, a 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) commissioner, Chairman 
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of the Public Oversight Board, and a public member of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
As a private practitioner, Al was a trusted adviser, a prolific author, 
and an expert on many securities laws, regulations, and rules. We were 
lucky to have Al participate in the first two lectures, but unfortunately he 
passed away in 2002. We are delighted that his family continues its close 
relationship with Morgan Lewis and Fordham and that they are here with 
us again this evening. We are also pleased by the continuing support of 
the SEC Historical Society and its Executive Director, Carla Rosati, for 
their contribution to this lecture series. Al gave the Society his time and 
some of his papers to help make the organization a terrific historical 
resource. 
Turning to tonight’s speaker, Ira Hammerman: Ira is the executive 
vice president and general counsel for the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”). Since 2004, Ira has overseen 
SIFMA’s legal advocacy efforts, including its response to the 2008 
financial crisis and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”). Prior to joining SIFMA, Ira was a 
partner at Clifford Chance, where he represented a wide range of financial 
services companies in regulatory and enforcement matters. In short, Ira 
has devoted his career to the securities industry and is one of its most 
passionate, articulate, and persuasive advocates. 
On a more personal note, I like to think that Ira is like the movie star 
Kevin Bacon, not because of his dance moves—although I am sure they 
are stellar—but because he is an icon of interconnectedness. If you will 
indulge me, I would like to explain with a version of the parlor game Six 
Degrees of Kevin Bacon, featuring Ira Hammerman in the role of Kevin 
Bacon. For those of you not familiar with this pastime, because Bacon has 
been in so many different types of Hollywood movies, the premise of the 
game is that he can be connected to almost any actor with only a few 
steps; the number of steps is a person’s “Bacon number.” 
For example, Marlon Brando can be connected to Kevin Bacon in 
just two steps: Brando was in the movie The Score with Robert De Niro, 
who was in Sleepers with Kevin Bacon; Brando’s Bacon number is two. 
But back to Ira: Ira is connected to Morgan Lewis in many ways, 
leading to Hammerman number possibilities. Ira’s father, Steve 
Hammerman, like Al, was a senior leader at the SEC. Steve served as 
Regional Director of the SEC’s New York office. As General Counsel at 
Merrill Lynch, Steve was a mentor to several lawyers who later became 
partners at Morgan Lewis and was a longtime client of the firm. He 
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worked with our own John Peloso and literally dozens of others at the 
firm on one of Merrill Lynch’s greatest legal challenges, the bankruptcy 
of Orange County, California; Hammerman number—two. 
Ira’s brother, Charlie Hammerman, was an associate at Morgan 
Lewis before he went on to create and run an outstanding nonprofit 
organization called The Disability Opportunity Fund. It helps disabled 
people throughout the country in the areas of housing, education, and 
training. Our former partner, Anne Flannery, who is also here tonight, 
serves on the organization’s board of directors; Hammerman numbers—
two and three. 
And, oh yes, there is Ira himself. At Morgan Lewis we have had the 
privilege of working closely with Ira on several important initiatives at 
SIFMA, including most recently his efforts in the area of fiduciary duty 
in the securities industry. We have had a long and productive relationship 
with Ira and his team at SIFMA, where a couple of our former colleagues 
work. I am not good at math, so I have lost track of the Hammerman 
numbers. We look forward to continuing to assist SIFMA in the years 
ahead. Now that you know how he is connected, we are thrilled that Ira is 
here to speak tonight. 
Last year’s speaker, former SEC Commissioner Joe Grundfest, gave 
us a speech with the catchy title, “Is the SEC Afraid of Federal Juries and 
Judges?” Not to be outdone, tonight Ira gives a nod to pop culture and 
Lin-Manuel Miranda’s Broadway hit Hamilton and is set to deliver, 
“SEC—Don’t Throw Away Your Shot! A Renewed Call for a Uniform 
Fiduciary Standard to Protect Individual Investors.” It promises to be a 
blockbuster. Incidentally, if you want to know Miranda’s Bacon number, 
see my colleague Ariel Gursky at the reception—she has the answer. 
In any event, I know that Al would have loved to be here tonight to 
listen to Ira take his shot and, if we are lucky, rap a little chorus. Morgan 
Lewis is proud of Al Sommer’s dedication to the securities bar and his 
affiliation with our firm, and we are pleased to sponsor this annual lecture 
in his honor. I am delighted to turn the podium over to our speaker tonight, 
Kevin—I mean Ira—Hammerman. Thank you. 
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LECTURE 
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: Thank you, Ben, for that kind and funny 
introduction. Oh, and by the way, my Bacon number is four. You see, a 
few months ago I met Lin-Manuel Miranda—that is one; Lin was in The 
Polar Bears, a movie with Armie Hammer—that is two; Hammer was in 
The Social Network with Jason Flemyng—that is three; and Jason was in 
X-Men: First Class with Kevin Bacon—that is four. Do you follow all 
that? 
Now that we got that out of the way, let me say I am very honored 
and humbled to join you today to deliver the seventeenth Annual A. A. 
Sommer, Jr. Lecture. I would like to thank both Morgan Lewis and 
Fordham Law for giving me the privilege of addressing you this evening, 
and it is extra special to deliver this lecture in front of Starr and some of 
Al’s other family members who I had the pleasure to meet a few moments 
ago. As we all know, Al Sommer was a leader and pioneer at Morgan 
Lewis and began that fine firm’s focus and preeminence in securities law 
and in serving the financial services industry. 
At the risk of inadvertently leaving anyone out, Morgan Lewis gave 
us an earlier generation of leaders that I have come to know and respect, 
many of whom are here tonight: folks like Lloyd Feller, John Peloso, 
Anne Flannery, Bob Romano, John Hartigan, and Bob Mendelson, among 
many others, and today’s leaders, like Ben Indek, Steve Stone, John 
Ayanian, Sam Shaulson, Dan Kleinman, and Jon Roelke, who continue 
that fine tradition. So thank you, Morgan Lewis, for thinking of me for 
this honor. 
I would also like to thank Fordham Law School, which has partnered 
with Morgan Lewis since 2000, when this important lecture series to 
honor Al began. 
I am embarrassed to say it has been over thirty-one years since I 
visited Fordham. But I have a really, really good excuse. You see, the last 
time I was here, July 30 and 31 of 1985, it was a traumatic couple of days. 
Yes, I had the lucky privilege of sitting for the New York bar exam right 
here at Fordham. Now, I say “lucky” intentionally because that was the 
summer that 542 bar exam answer sheets were lost—or is stolen the right 
word?—from the Pier 90 location where so many other law school 
graduates took the exam that summer, thirty-one years ago. That is a true 
story—you can Google it—so, believe me, I love Fordham. 
I remember Al Sommer, not from his SEC Commissioner days of 
1973 to 1976—I was a Long Island teenager back then, more focused on 
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the New York Knicks and their 1973 championship team—but as a young 
securities lawyer in the 1980s. I do remember seeing Al on various 
securities law panels at conferences, and I would read his writings from 
the SEC and from when he was at Morgan Lewis. 
Al was a giant among securities lawyers. He was a forward thinker. 
In fact, the topic that I have chosen to address this evening is both a tribute 
to the forward thinking of Al and an important story that remains very 
much in progress. My address is entitled, “SEC—Don’t Throw Away 
Your Shot!” It is both a nod to the Broadway smash hit Hamilton—with 
which I admit I am a bit obsessed, having seen it now five times—but, 
more importantly, it is a renewed call for the SEC to create a uniform 
fiduciary standard to protect individual investors. 
For those of you who have not yet seen the megahit Hamilton, here’s 
a very quick dose of the show honoring our founding father. At any rate, 
Al foretold the emergence and expansion of fiduciary duties in the 
securities industry, and that was nearly four decades ago in 1978 when he 
penned a law review article entitled, “Fiduciary Duties: The Search for 
Content.”1 Al began that article with a celebrated quote from Justice 
Frankfurter that is as relevant today as it was back then: 
To say that a man is a fiduciary only begins the analysis. It gives 
direction to further inquiry: To whom is he a fiduciary? What 
obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed 
to discharge those obligations? And what are the consequences of his 
deviation from the duty?2 
This quote touches on a key concept in today’s fiduciary debate, i.e., 
while there are some fundamental and uniform elements of a fiduciary 
duty no matter the context, it is equally true that the manner in which 
fiduciary duty is applied in any specific context has elements of 
uniqueness that justify separate consideration. 
As the General Counsel of SIFMA, I am reminded of this duality 
every day. Our members include broker-dealers, banks, and investment 
advisers, who recognize that they must act in their clients’ best interests 
every day or risk losing those very clients. There is, however, no one-size-
fits-all best interest or fiduciary standard that now applies, or that could 
ever apply, to the diverse group of business models and functions that our 
members follow and perform. And yet, for many years now SIFMA has 
                                                
 1. A. A. Sommer, Jr., Fiduciary Duties–The Search for Content, 9 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
525 (1978). 
 2. Id. at 525. 
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been calling for the SEC to create a uniform fiduciary standard. How can 
that be? How did that come to pass? Or, as Lin-Manuel Miranda’s 
Hamilton might have phrased it, “How does a broker, dealer, intensely 
regulated firm operate so smart yet debate whether he has his client’s best 
interest at heart?”3 I know, I know. This white, Jewish, middle-aged 
securities lawyer cannot rap at all—I get that. 
Our story may not be quite as dramatic as Hamilton’s, but let me 
provide a roadmap of three key points that I would like you to take away 
from tonight’s lecture. First, let us understand what problem a uniform 
fiduciary standard is intended to solve and where things stand today; 
second, let us present a solution to the problem of what is the optimal path 
forward; third and finally, let us consider how we can remove 
impediments to the solution, and here I will touch on why SIFMA is suing 
the Department of Labor (“DoL”). 
Let us start with the functions that investment advisers and brokers 
perform. The core function of an investment adviser is to provide 
continuous investment advice to its clients. Some also provide financial 
planning services and reports on securities. Brokers, on the other hand, 
operate across a far broader spectrum. While many brokers provide 
investment advice, others do not. Instead, they focus their business 
activities on clearing and settling trades, underwriting securities, or 
serving as market makers, for example. 
Why is this important? Because the fiduciary debate focuses on the 
narrow overlap in services provided by brokers and advisers, i.e., when 
they each provide personalized investment advice to their retail clients. 
Yet, even when brokers and advisers engage in the same service, there are 
important differences between the kinds of investment advice they 
provide. Advisers, on the one hand, provide continuous and regular 
investment advice to their clients, which entails an ongoing duty to 
supervise the account regardless of whether any trading occurs. In 
contrast, brokers typically provide episodic investment advice incidental 
to a specific transaction and are compensated through commissions or 
similar transaction-based arrangements. Most retail investors, including 
retirement savers, choose brokerage accounts because they are buy-and-
hold investors, and brokerage accounts are a more cost-effective choice. 
                                                
 3. Ira D. Hammerman, PowerPoint Presentation for the Seventeenth Annual A. A. 
Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities & Financial Law (Nov. 10, 2016) (on file 
with the Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law). 
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Another key difference is that advisers generally exercise investment 
discretion over their client accounts, meaning that the adviser has the 
power granted by the client to trade on the client’s behalf without even 
speaking with the client. Brokers, on the other hand, provide 
nondiscretionary advice. A broker generally cannot trade on his or her 
client’s behalf; instead the broker makes an investment recommendation, 
and the client is free to take it or leave it. Of course, the biggest difference 
between brokers and advisers is the way they are regulated today under 
regulatory schemes that trace their roots back to the 1930s and 1940s with 
the passage of the federal statutes that govern brokers and advisers. 
As this group well knows, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
(“Advisers Act”)4 does not expressly mandate a fiduciary duty, but one 
was read into the Act by the famous 1963 Supreme Court case in Capital 
Gains.5 In that case, the court held that Section 206 of the Advisers Act 
imposes fiduciary duties on advisers by operation of law.6 Brokers, on the 
other hand, are governed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(“Exchange Act”),7 which recognizes that a broker who provides 
personalized investment advice and recommendations to retail clients is 
generally not a fiduciary but owes a duty of fair dealing to her clients. 
Why then, you may ask, when brokers engage in the same conduct 
as advisers—namely, providing investment advice—do they not need to 
comply with the presumptively higher fiduciary standard under the 
Advisers Act?8 The answer lies in the broker-dealer exclusion. In passing 
the Advisers Act, Congress saw fit to provide an exclusion for the 
episodic nondiscretionary advice that brokers typically provide to their 
clients.9 Thus, under the Advisers Act, brokers are excluded from the 
definition of adviser where the advice they provide is solely incidental to 
their brokerage business and when they receive no special compensation 
for the advice.10 The broker-dealer exclusion reflects Congress’ clear 
understanding that there is a natural interrelationship between brokerage 
services and providing investment advice and that brokers are already 
comprehensively regulated under the Exchange Act.11 
                                                
 4. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2012). 
 5. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
 6. Id. at 184-85. 
 7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk. 
 8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21. 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk. 
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Indeed, over the intervening eight-plus decades, the SEC, the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), and the state 
securities regulators who oversee brokers have developed a fulsome 
regulatory regime based on a broker’s duty of fair dealing, including the 
obligation to make suitable recommendations; achieve best execution; 
observe high standards of commercial honor, and just and equitable 
principles of trade, a concept which itself embodies fiduciary principles. 
Brokers, as you know, are also subject to routine and regular exams 
from the SEC and FINRA, as opposed to visits by the SEC only once 
every eleven years or so for the adviser community. Thus, brokers and 
advisers currently operate under high, although somewhat different, 
standards of conduct that have developed under separate statutory and 
regulatory schemes over many decades. 
So far, so good. So, what happened; what changed? The short answer 
is that the brokerage community changed. It was once as simple as this: 
Figure 112 
But in the late 1980s and early 1990s, brokerage firms first started to 
introduce new types of full-service accounts—known as fee-based 
accounts—that emphasized the importance of the investment advice they 
provided and that changed their compensation structure to a fee-based 
model, just like investment advisers. 
A few years later, in May 1994, then-SEC Chair Arthur Levitt—the 
inaugural Sommer lecturer in 2000—formed a broad-based committee led 
by Dan Tully, then the Chairman and CEO of Merrill Lynch, to 
recommend best practices for managing conflicts of interest in the 
brokerage industry. In April of 1995, the Tully Report identified as a best 
practice that brokers should be compensated using asset-based fees 
                                                
 12. Hammerman, supra note 3. 
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instead of commissions.13 The thinking was that commissions created an 
incentive for brokers to trade frequently, or “churn” the account, and that 
often the best advice a broker can give a client is to do nothing. The Tully 
Report viewed fee-based brokerage as a means to better align the interests 
of brokers and their clients.14 The Tully Report encouraged fee-based 
brokerage accounts to proliferate.15 As they did, concerns arose among 
brokers and regulators that this form of compensation could be viewed as 
“special compensation,” thereby invoking the Advisers Act.16 
In 1999, the SEC stepped in and proposed a rule that would exempt 
brokers offering fee-based brokerage accounts from being deemed 
investment advisers if they satisfied certain conditions. The proposed rule 
is very controversial. Independent advisers represented by the Financial 
Planning Association (“FPA”) did not like the heightened and more direct 
competition from brokers that the proposed rule would allow. Regardless, 
the SEC adopted the rule in April of 2005.17 But shortly thereafter, the 
FPA sued the SEC to invalidate the rule, and in 2007 the D.C. Circuit 
Court did just that, ruling that the SEC had exceeded its authority when it 
adopted the rule.18 
The D.C. Circuit decision caused the SEC to reconsider the 
distinction between brokers and advisers, and so in 2008 it commissioned 
a study from the RAND Corporation,19 which found that while investors 
were generally happy with the service provided by their broker or adviser, 
these investors generally did not understand, or were even confused by, 
the differences between the duties owed by brokers and advisers under 
securities laws.20 
Throughout the following year, in 2009, numerous members of 
Congress and senior officials at the SEC and FINRA expressed their 
desire and intent to harmonize the regulatory regime for brokers and 
advisers. At that time, there was widespread acceptance that the 
harmonized standard should be a fiduciary one, under the belief that it 
                                                
 13. DANIEL P. TULLY ET AL., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
COMPENSATION PRACTICES 1 (1995). 
 14. Id. at 7, 10. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). 
 17. 17 C.F.R. § 275.202 (2016). 
 18. Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 19. ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND CORP., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES 
ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS (2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pr 
ess/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/SDU2-63KT]. 
 20. Id. at 118. 
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represents the highest standard and that investors deserve no less. SIFMA 
and its members were keenly aware that change was in the air. We wanted 
to be part of the conversation and, more importantly, part of a positive 
and constructive solution. Particularly in the wake of the financial crisis, 
we wanted to make very clear and public that our industry firmly supports 
consistent and high standards for interacting with individual clients, 
including putting the clients’ best interests first. 
Thus, in July of 2009, SIFMA’s Private Client Group convened and, 
in an act of leadership, passed a one-page resolution declaring SIFMA’s 
support for a fiduciary standard. Here you see the resolution: 
Figure 221 
In fact, my colleague Kevin Carroll, who is here with us tonight, was a 
key draftsperson of that. Kevin has been with me for nearly ten years as 
we continue to debate and discuss the fiduciary rule. One year later, on 
                                                
 21. Hammerman, supra note 3. 
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July 15, 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act.22 With respect to 
fiduciaries, Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the SEC to 
write rules to implement a new uniform fiduciary standard of conduct 
applicable to both brokers and advisers when they provide personalized 
investment advice about securities to retail clients.23 Section 913 requires 
the uniform fiduciary standard to be no less stringent than the general 
fiduciary implied under Section 206 of the Advisers Act.24 The SEC has 
no deadline to act, and—as we are all painfully aware, more than six years 
later—is not required to take any action at all. 
What is SIFMA asking the SEC to do with its Dodd-Frank Section 
913 authority? We want the SEC to do precisely what Congress intended 
and what Section 913 requires—namely, to articulate the fiduciary duty 
implied under Section 206 of the Advisers Act through new rule-making 
for brokers under the Exchange Act.25 The SEC should issue the necessary 
rules and guidance to enable brokers to apply the standard to their distinct 
operational model.26 The plain language of Section 913 together with the 
legislative history of Dodd-Frank makes clear that the requirement that 
the uniform fiduciary standard be no less stringent than the general 
fiduciary duty implied under Section 206 does not require the SEC to 
impose Advisers Act rules, guidance, and legal precedence on broker-
dealers.27 
Do not take our word for it. Congressman Barney Frank, then a 
primary author of the Dodd-Frank Act, said so explicitly in a letter to the 
SEC Chair, Mary Schapiro, back in 2011.28 So, what is the problem with 
extending the Advisers Act guidance and precedent to brokers? The 
problem is that such guidance and precedent is based upon the specific 
type of services provided and disclosures made by investment advisers 
and, thus, it is inherently not directly applicable to broker-dealers.29 
                                                
 22. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 
U.S.C.). 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k) (2012). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Memorandum from Ira D. Hammerman to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairwoman, Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n (July 14, 2011) (on file with SIFMA). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Memorandum from Barney Frank to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairwoman, Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 28, 2011) (on file with author). 
 29. Memorandum from Ira D. Hammerman, supra note 25. 
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This is a critically important point, and it is the same point that Al 
Sommer wrote about nearly four decades ago—namely, that establishing 
an intermediary, a fiduciary who is required to act in the best interests of 
the investor is only the beginning of the analysis, not the end.30 Because 
of fundamental differences between brokers’ and advisers’ roles and 
business models, attempting to apply the Advisers Act guidance and 
precedent to brokers without further clarification by the SEC would create 
a high risk of confusion and misapplication, resulting in unnecessary legal 
and compliance costs under the new standard.31 At a minimum, SEC rules 
and guidance should adequately address a wide range of common 
scenarios that brokers face in their daily dealings with clients.32 
As we have limited time this evening, allow me to articulate just one 
scenario that is very common today and that the SEC would need to 
address in clear guidance at the time any uniform fiduciary standard of 
care would be formally adopted. This slide is called “The Holistic Review 
of a Client Relationship”: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 333 
This is very common. Because of several months of market volatility, 
Lucy and John Smith ask their broker to meet with them to provide a 
review of the overall performance of all five of the family’s accounts held 
at the firm. The broker responds and provides the Smiths with a review of 
the fee-based discretionary account as well as the transactional brokerage 
account, a self-directed account, an IRA, and the 529 college plan 
accounts. We need SEC guidance to address the following: if the broker 
chooses to provide the Smiths with a holistic review, including the no-
advice brokerage and the self-directed accounts, which are not subject to 
                                                
 30. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 31. Memorandum from Ira D. Hammerman, supra note 25. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Hammerman, supra note 3. 
  
Holistic Review of “Client Relationship” 
 
 Transaction: As a result of several months of market 
volatility, Lucy and Jon ask their broker to meet with them 
to provide a review of the overall performance of all of the 
family’s accounts held at the firm. The broker responds 
and provides the Smiths with a review of the fee-based as 
well as other accounts including transactional brokerage 
and self-directed accounts. 
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a fiduciary duty, would the broker potentially create a new fiduciary 
obligation for the no-advice accounts by simply doing the right thing and 
meeting with the client to discuss all of the accounts? 
Even though there are many unanswered questions, SIFMA has laid 
the foundation, provided the data, and presented a compelling case for the 
SEC to exercise its Section 913 authority over these past seven years.34 
Many of the prior comment letters and testimony that we have provided 
are on the SIFMA website. We have a statute that authorizes it, an 
industry that wants it, and two consecutive SEC chairs who say it is a top 
priority. So, why do we not have a uniform fiduciary standard today? 
At this moment, I hope we can achieve a moment of clarity, 
leadership, and forward thinking. My hope is that the SEC and its leaders 
take a cue from the Hamilton cast, performing eight shows a week a few 
blocks from here, and do not “throw away their shot.”35 At the risk of 
continuing my homage to Hamilton, I am reminded of the famous line 
that Hamilton raps when speaking of his friend, rival, nemesis, and 
ultimate dueling partner, Aaron Burr: “If you stand for nothing, Burr, 
what will you fall for?”36 
To our colleagues at the Commission, be they the current occupants 
of the tenth floor or the next crew to be nominated by President-Elect 
Trump, I sincerely hope you can take a stand and produce some tangible 
action on this important investor protection issue. In the meantime, what 
else can SIFMA do to further pave the way for an eventual uniform 
fiduciary standard from the SEC? I am glad you asked. That is what our 
legal challenge to the DoL fiduciary rule is intended to do. 
As should be crystal clear now, our pending lawsuit with the DoL is 
not a fight against a fiduciary standard; rather, our lawsuit is necessary 
because of the botched way the DoL is attempting to achieve its goal. The 
DoL has, unfortunately, injected itself into the fiduciary debate covered 
by Dodd-Frank and created a rule that applies to just one sliver of 
                                                
 34. Memorandum from Kevin M. Carroll to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Aug. 8, 2016) (on file with SIFMA). 
 35. See Lin-Manuel Miranda–My Shot Lyrics, MUSIXMATCH (last updated Jan. 22, 
2017), https://www.musixmatch.com/lyrics/Lin-Manuel-Miranda/My-Shot [https://perm 
a.cc/9ANB-BFBZ]. 
 36. Lin-Manuel Miranda–Aaron Burr, Sir (Off-Broadway) Lyrics, GENIUS, 
https://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-aaron-burr-sir-off-broadway-lyrics [https://per 
ma.cc/EVE9-BERD]. 
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investment advice in the only space it has jurisdiction, and that is certain 
retirement accounts.37 
The DoL rule creates a confusing, bifurcated system for both 
financial advisers and their clients, and it stands in direct conflict with the 
uniform fiduciary standard contemplated under Dodd-Frank. Moreover, 
the DoL rule will be extremely costly and will limit Americans’ access to 
retirement-planning advice.38 Some clients, particularly small accounts, 
may become too expensive to service and will likely get dropped. Others 
will likely be forced into asset-based accounts, where they will pay more 
for their advice. 
So, DoL got it wrong. But does that mean it violated the law? In this 
case, yes. Our lawsuit details several violations and causes of action.39 I 
will just quickly highlight two. First, the DoL exceeded its statutory 
authority in promulgating this rule. The rule over-broadly redefines who 
is a fiduciary, and in doing so it sweeps in every person who sells a 
retirement-related product and then prohibits them from receiving 
commissions that have been a mainstay of their business model for 
decades.40 The DoL rule improperly intrudes upon the jurisdiction of the 
SEC, which was directed by Congress to create a uniform fiduciary 
standard.41 The SEC’s jurisdiction applies to all investment advice, 
whereas DoL is limited to only retirement accounts.42 The SEC has 
extensive enforcement and exam authority; the DoL, however, has no 
enforcement or exam authority over individual retirement accounts. The 
DoL rule is like the tail wagging the dog. The DoL must yield to the SEC 
in this already claimed space. 
                                                
 37. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 
2509, 2510, 2550). 
 38. See id. 
 39. Carol Danko, Lawsuit Filed to Challenge New Department of Labor Rule That 
Prevents Financial Professionals from Best Serving Retirement Savers, SIFMA (June 2, 
2016), http://www.sifma.org/newsroom/2016/lawsuit-filed-to-challenge-new-departme 
nt-of-labor-rule-that-prevents-financial-professionals-from-best-serving-retirement-save 
rs/ [https://perma.cc/2KZX-EQZK]. 
 40. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement 
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20,946. 
 41. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-
DEALERS (2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/C645-N949]. 
 42. Id. 
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Second, and perhaps most importantly, our lawsuit takes issue with 
the rule’s Best Interest Contract Exemption (“BICE”), which essentially 
forces firms to enter into legally binding contracts with clients in order to 
continue doing business on the same terms and to subject themselves to 
class-action lawsuits from the plaintiffs’ bar that the DoL has no authority 
to impose.43 The DoL thus abused its exemptive authority by forcing 
financial professionals to rely on BICE and then conditioning that 
exemption on their agreement to requirements and liabilities that the DoL 
has no power to impose or enforce. Precisely because the DoL has no 
enforcement authority in this area, it has delegated enforcement to private 
litigants. 
It is truly an unprecedented, exploitative, and improper action by a 
federal agency. This is why we have taken legal action to stop the rule. 
We are hopeful that the courts will see how the DoL exceeded its authority 
and created a rule so complex and so costly that it will make receiving 
and giving financial advice more expensive for hardworking Americans 
saving for retirement.44 
That brings me to my conclusion. I hope each of you will take away 
a better understanding of the origins of the call for a uniform best interest 
standard, SIFMA’s views on how to implement it, the urgency of our call 
to do so now, and finally, why we were compelled to litigate with DoL to 
maintain the promise of a uniform fiduciary standard. 
The future remains as uncertain as ever. Our DoL case goes to a 
hearing next week, and the SEC’s direction under its Dodd-Frank 
authority remains murky. Who knows? Maybe seventeen years from now, 
the thirty-fourth Annual Sommer Lecture in 2033, when we have all 
converted to the fee-based advisory model, will lament the death of and 
call for the return of the commission-based brokerage account, while we 
all scratch our heads wondering, “How did we get into this mess?” 
Stranger things could happen. Stay tuned. This saga has many chapters 
still to go. 
For my final Hamilton reference, whenever the fiduciary debate gets 
sorted out, all I know is “I wanna [sic] be in the room where it happens.”45 
Thank you for listening and, again, thank you for the honor. 
                                                
 43. Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). 
 44. Danko, supra note 39. 
 45. The Room Where It Happens Lyrics–Lin-Manuel Miranda, GENIUS, https://geni 
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YBEZ]. 
322 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
DEAN DILLER: Ira has agreed to take some questions and 
comments. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. You are giving your speech at 
an interesting time. Should the SEC move ahead with a uniform standard 
now requiring broker-dealers to honor the best interests of their clients? 
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: One of the themes in my talk was that we 
do think the SEC is the proper agency to move forward. To answer your 
question about doing it now, there are many complexities to them acting 
now. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: If I could push that, I do not expect them to 
act this week, but suppose that the new administration proposed that 
Dodd-Frank be repealed in whole; would you favor the SEC retaining its 
authority to adopt a uniform fiduciary standard? 
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: I guess we will all have to wait and see 
about the first part of your question. I personally would be surprised if 
now President-Elect Trump, who is no longer campaigning for office, will 
still be pushing for the repeal of Dodd-Frank, which I think was the 
premise of your question. I do not think we will end up going down that 
path. But whether we do or not, the answer to the second part of your 
question is that the SEC is the expert agency; it is the right agency to deal 
with this issue. Whether or not this issue remains in Dodd-Frank, I believe 
we would still be in favor of the SEC being the proper agency to wrestle 
with this very complicated issue and topic. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What is your sense of why the SEC has not 
acted? There were all kinds of opportunities obviously before the DoL 
started to move. When it became apparent the DoL was starting to move, 
there was even a greater incentive, and I think an encouragement, on 
many people’s parts to get the SEC to move, and yet it seems not to have 
gotten off the ground. Notwithstanding all the other things it had to do, 
why let the issue get processed by DoL? 
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: Great question. We have been asking that 
same question for six-plus years now. We have heard everything, 
including “it’s complicated”—but life is complicated. We still have 
enough support and belief that the SEC could figure it out. So, yes, it is 
complicated; yes, Congress may not have given them the most artful 
language in Section 913 to resolve the best interests of the client with 
preserving a commission-based model.46 We totally respect and 
understand that it is a complicated issue, but we are also a bit disappointed 
                                                
 46. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012). 
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that now, six and seven years on, they really have not moved the ball 
forward, at least publicly. We would hear lots of discussion internally that 
investment management and trading and markets were working together 
on it, but we certainly have not seen anything. Hopefully, new day, new 
administration, that can change. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This may be the other side of the same 
question, which is: do you have any sense as to what prompted the DoL 
to step into this, the SEC not having acted? 
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: My only observation—and you and your 
colleagues have seen a lot over the years as well—is that this was 
politically motivated rule-making from day one. In my career, I do not 
remember a sitting president having a press conference over a proposal 
that some agency was thinking about, and this was just very politically 
charged from the get go. It is like it was preordained in terms of what the 
DoL would do here. It has been disappointing that the SEC has not taken 
the lead. I am a “glass half-full” kind of guy, so I am hoping now—we 
are going to have a change in administrations, there will be new folks 
leading the SEC, and who knows what happens on the DoL side of the 
equation? There will be a new Secretary of Labor. President-Elect Trump 
will have many things to work through, and hopefully the DoL piece is 
on that list as well. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was curious what you thought was a 
bigger inspiration for the SEC to act now: that potentially other agencies 
like the DoL would be intruding on its space to govern, or if it was because 
individual investors were being harmed by not having this uniform 
fiduciary standard? 
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: As I tried to address in the talk, the 
securities business is an intensely and heavily regulated industry—at the 
federal level, state level, and also by the self-regulatory organizations. We 
can certainly debate that if you are a broker-dealer or an investment 
adviser, at the federal level you are heavily regulated. 
The challenge has been—as in many things in life—business goes 
faster than regulation. So, the business over the last twenty and thirty 
years has converged—the broker-dealer model, the investment adviser 
model; everyone is in the advice business now. That is what customers 
need, want, and are willing to pay for. But we want to preserve the 
customer experience and the customers’ choices over how they pay for 
their services. Some people want commissions—they do not trade all that 
much. Others need a lot more hand holding and constant monitoring of 
their accounts, and maybe asset-based pricing works for them. But, 
regardless of which side of the fence you are on, brokers or advisers, what 
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we think at SIFMA is, the time has come to now have that same uniform 
fiduciary standard of care so when the customer is receiving advice they 
should know that standard is the same. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Our system of securities laws does have 
different tiers of protection for investors of different levels of 
sophistication. So why is it that there could not be this unified standard 
and then the additional standard set forth by the DoL when it comes to 
retirement accounts where, in many cases, we are dealing with the least 
sophisticated investors? 
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: The challenge is if you are in the financial 
services industry today, you have many different regulators, and if you 
are going to have the DoL with its standard of care and the SEC with 
multiple standards of care—because you have the fiduciary standard if 
you are under the Advisers Act, you have the suitability standard if you 
are a broker-dealer—firms, particularly the larger firms with 10,000, 
15,000 financial advisers and millions of households as customers, need 
to come up with a system that is going to work so that they can educate 
their employees. To have one agency that is not as much of an expert in 
the securities market and securities laws dictate how an IRA account 
should be held, as I say in the talk, is the tail wagging the dog. 
At many of the brokerage firms, the largest percentage of retail 
customer securities are in the IRA account—that is kind of the bread-and-
butter business of the financial services industry—and many of those 
customers are buy-and-hold investors who are comfortable paying a 
commission when they buy a security and know that they are going to 
hold Apple, just to use an example, for ten years and twenty years. So, 
they pay once, and it is in their account. That is a choice that they like, 
and we want to preserve their ability. 
For the DoL—again, not an expert in what is going on in terms of 
the securities markets—to come up and say, “You know what? We do not 
like commissions, and we are going to make it very, very difficult to do a 
commission business” kind of forces people into asset-based pricing, and 
that is taking away choice from the customers. 
To really simplify it, the DoL is saying, “Index funds–good; active 
funds–bad,” and they are saying, “Fee-based accounts–good; 
commissions–bad.” What we are saying on behalf of our members is, 
“Customers want choice.” The industry has longstanding relationships 
with its customers, and it knows what its customers want; it is in a service 
business, and it wants to preserve choice for its customers. 
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DEAN DILLER: Well, thank you for making a complex subject so 
clear that even I can understand it, and thank you for your thoughtful 
remarks. 
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: Thank you. 
 
